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“It all started as an experiment in 1946, when the volume of family 
disputes for the entire city was handled . . . in the District [M]agistrates 
courts in the usual run-of-the-mill fashion. What we sought was to 
remove the rigid formalism of court room atmosphere and procedure 
and to individualize, in so far as possible, the cases that were brought 
before us. . . . to mend broken lives.”1 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 Many proclaim that criminal domestic violence courts − 
∗Copyright © 2007, 2008 Mae C. Quinn.  Associate Professor of Law, University of Tennessee 
College of Law.  This paper is dedicated to Dr. Helen K. Golden, daughter of Anna Moscowitz 
Kross, who has kindly supported and encouraged my research and writing about her mother.  Words 
cannot express my gratitude for her warmth and generosity in welcoming me into her life and into 
the life of her family.  Many thanks also to Professor Tracy Thomas, Associate Dean Elizabeth 
Reilly, and the University of Akron School of Law for sponsoring the New Face of Women’s Legal 
History Conference in October 2007, at which I delivered remarks relating to this article, and to 
Rosemary Burr, Mary Pat Byrn, Jennifer Hendricks, Amy Hess, and William Montross for their 
comments on an earlier draft.  My continuing gratitude to the American Jewish Archives at Hebrew 
Union College, which maintains Kross’s papers. 
 1. Anna M. Kross, A Love Seat in Court, LOOK MAG., March 1, 1950, at 2 (on file with 
author). 
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specialized court parts that focus on intimate violence cases and utilize a 
particularized approach in such prosecutions to prevent further violence 
− are a recent innovation within our criminal justice system.  Most 
observers point to the Quincy District Court in Massachusetts, which 
opened in 1987, as the first venue in this country to offer specialized 
processing of criminal domestic abuse prosecutions.2  In the two decades 
since the Quincy court opened its doors, other jurisdictions have 
developed similar models using similar specialized approaches.3 
 A growing body of literature lauds the “innovative,” coordinated 
approaches employed by these courts, including no-drop prosecution 
policies to protect complaining witnesses and court-ordered batterer 
intervention programs for those accused of violence.4  These practices 
 2. ROBERT V. WOLF, CALIFORNIA’S COLLABORATIVE JUSTICE COURTS: BUILDING A 
PROBLEM-SOLVING JUDICIARY 15 (2005), available at  
http://www.courtinnovation.org/_uploads/documents/CA%20Story_1.pdf (“The first domestic 
violence court was launched in Quincy, Massachusetts, in 1987.”);  GREG BERMAN & JOHN 
FEINBLATT, JUDGES AND PROBLEM-SOLVING COURTS 8 (2002), available at 
http://www.courtinnovation.org/_uploads/documents/JudgesProblemSolvingCourts1.pdf (“The first 
domestic violence court was launched in Quincy, Massachusetts, in 1987.”); see also Elena 
Salzman, The Quincy District Court Domestic Violence Prevention Program: A Model Legal 
Framework for Domestic Violence Intervention, 74 B.U.L. REV. 329 (1994); Jennifer Thompson, 
Note, Who’s Afraid of Judicial Activism? Reconceptualizing A Traditional Paradigm in the Context 
of Specialized Domestic Violence Programs, 56 MAINE L. REV. 407, 415-420 (2004) (offering a 
history of domestic violence policies and indicating that until the 1970s and 1980s intimate violence 
was not prosecuted criminally but was seen as a private matter between family members). 
 3.  See generally RONALD SHELTON, THE CURRENT STATE OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE COURTS 
IN THE UNITED STATES 2007, available at http://contentdm.ncsconline.org/cgi-
bin/showfile.exe?CISOROOT=/famct&CISOPTR=173 (cataloguing the emergence and spread of 
domestic violence courts throughout the United States over the last two decades and describing this 
as a recent phenomenon); Betsy Tsai, The Trend Toward Specialized Domestic Violence Courts: 
Improvements on an Effective Innovation, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1285, 1298-1309 (2000) 
(discussing the rise in popularity of domestic violence courts following the creation of the Quincy 
Court); see also Laylan Copelin, New Court Dedicated to Family Violence, AUSTIN AM. 
STATESMAN, Jan. 4, 1999, at B1 (describing Austin, Texas’s first criminal domestic violence court); 
Domestic Violence Court A Solid Recommendation, THE JACKSON SUN, Nov. 13, 2007 (calling for 
the creation of a domestic violence court in Jackson, Tennessee).  Judge Shelton suggests that 
modern “feminization” of the bench may have paved the way to acceptance of specialized domestic 
violence courts.  SHELTON, supra, at 8.  Cf.  Mae C. Quinn, Revisiting Anna Moscowitz Kross’s 
Critique of the New York City Women’s Court: The Problem of Solving the “Problem” of 
Prostitution with Specialized Criminal Courts, 33 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 665, 681-82 n.86 (2006) 
[hereinafter Quinn, Revisiting] (discussing “feminization” of the bench in the 1930s in conjunction 
with the Women’s Court movement). 
 4. See generally SHELTON, supra note 3, at 8-10; ROBERT V. WOLF, LIBERTY ALDRICH & 
SAMANTHA MOORE, PLANNING A DOMESTIC VIOLENCE COURT: THE NEW YORK STATE 
EXPERIENCE 18 (2004), available at  
http://www.courtinnovation.org/_uploads/documents/dvplanningdiary.pdf; Robin Mazur & Liberty 
Aldrich, What Makes a Domestic Violence Court Work? Lessons from New York, 42 JUDGES’ J. 5, 6 
(2003), available at http://www.mncourts.gov/?page=1737 (“Domestic violence court is designed to 
2
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and policies grow from the assumption that domestic violence crimes are 
different from others, presenting a particular dynamic between abuser 
and victim that requires a unique kind of case processing.5  Accused 
abusers present a future danger and are in need of punishment and 
monitoring; alleged victims are vulnerable and in need of ongoing 
protection from defendant abuse and control.6 
 Court planners in New York assert that its first criminal domestic 
violence court was established in 1996.7  Located in Brooklyn, that 
institution has been described as a leader in the domestic violence court 
movement for its consistent use of these innovative approaches and its 
development of a “dedicated court team.”8 The team, including “judge, 
attorneys, victim advocates and a resource coordinator—ensures that 
address traditional problems of domestic violence, such as low reports, withdrawn charges, threats 
to victim, lack of defendant accountability, and high recidivism, by intense judicial scrutiny of the 
defendant and close cooperation between the judiciary and social services.”); Municipal Court of 
Seattle webpage, available at http://www.seattle.gov/courts/prob/dvprob.htm (last visited Jan. 20, 
2008) (describing the domestic violence court’s policies, including that “[i]n many cases, the City 
will prosecute a case even if the victim refuses to testify”). 
 5. SHELTON, supra note 3, at 5-11 (describing the evolution of current domestic violence 
policies based upon an evolving understanding of violence between intimates); WOLF, ALDRICH & 
MOORE, supra note 4, at 3-4 (describing underlying assumptions between defendants and 
complaining witnesses in domestic abuse cases).  According to New York State Chief Judge Judith 
Kaye, “[b]ecause of their intimate bond with the victim, perpetrators of domestic violence present a 
particularly high risk of continuing, even escalating the violence against the complainant as they 
seek further control over her choices and actions.”  Id. at 4.  See also NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF 
JUSTICE, DO BATTERER INTERVENTION PROGRAMS WORK? TWO STUDIES 2 (2003), available at 
http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/200331.pdf (discussing the use by victims’ advocates of the 
“power and control wheel” theory to understand family violence, which assumes that the accused 
wants to control his partner’s behaviors and that “changing this dynamic is key to changing their 
behavior”). 
 6. SHELTON, supra note 3, at 8-10 (“Domestic violence courts . . . focus primarily on the 
victim rather than the offender.  The initial focus is on the safety of the battered women and any 
children that are involved.  The court also focuses on the accountability of the offender for his own 
misconduct rather than exploring the etiology of that conduct.”); Judith S. Kaye & Susan K. Knipps, 
Judicial Responses to Domestic Violence: The Call for a Problem-Solving Approach, 27 W. ST. U. 
L. REV. 1, 6-7 (1999-2000) (calling for reforms in processing of criminal domestic violence matters 
to take account of the “special characteristics” of such cases including complainants who have 
safety concerns and defendants who need close judicial monitoring even before a finding of guilt); 
see also Debra Raye Hayes Ogden, Prosecuting Domestic Violence Crimes: Effectively Using Rule 
404(b) to Hold Batterers Accountable for Repeated Abuse, 34 GONZ. L. REV. 361, 364 (1998) 
(indicating that all men who abuse do so as a means of controlling their victims and that such 
conduct is a learned behavior, not a feature of any illness). 
 7. Mazur & Aldrich, supra note 4, at 6 (“The first domestic violence court in the state 
opened in Brooklyn in 1996 . . . .”); WOLF, ALDRICH & MOORE, supra note 4 (chronicling the 
creation of domestic violence courts in New York, starting with the “inception” of the first such 
court in 1996). 
 8. WOLF, ALDRICH & MOORE, supra note 4, at 5 (“‘[D]efendant accountability and victim 
safety’ has become the mantra of New York’s domestic violence courts . . . .”). 
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defendants are carefully monitored, victims have access to 
comprehensive services and the judges have the information they need to 
make quick and effective decisions.”9 
These contemporary accounts of judicial innovation fail to 
acknowledge, however, that a somewhat similar experiment in specially 
adjudicating domestic violence prosecutions was undertaken more than 
fifty years ago in New York.  In 1946, Judge Anna Moscowitz Kross 
established New York State’s first criminal domestic violence court 
within New York City’s Magistrates’ Court system.10  The Home Term 
Part, as Kross’s court was called, was a groundbreaking experiment in 
criminal justice that sought to employ a particularized approach in 
domestic violence cases to address charges of assault, harassment, 
disorderly conduct and other abuses.  Nevertheless, Kross, one of New 
York’s first women judges, and her early attempts at judicial innovation 
like the Home Term Part, have been largely forgotten by legal historians 
and court reformers alike.11 
This paper seeks to inform current conversations about dedicated 
domestic violence courts by shedding light on Kross’s remarkable early 
efforts to treat domestic violence prosecutions differently from other 
criminal matters and handle them in a designated court part.  The story 
of Kross’s Home Term Part – the first specialized criminal domestic 
violence court in New York and perhaps the United States—is an 
important chapter in the history of intimate violence policies in this 
country.  Recognition of Home Term is crucial to any complete account 
and understanding of our criminal justice system’s renewed efforts at 
judicial innovation through specialized “problem-solving” courts.  And 
although many practices of Home Term would be viewed as 
objectionable by modern standards, examining Home Term may also 
 9. See The Center for Court Innovation – Brooklyn Domestic Violence Court webpage, 
http://www.courtinnovation.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=page.viewPage&PageID=599 (last visited 
Nov. 29, 2007); see also Mazur & Aldrich,  supra note 4, at 7-8; WOLF, ALDRICH & MOORE, supra 
note 4. 
 10. Shirley F. Mehl, Judge Anna Kross and the Home Term Court, 36 WOMEN LAW. J. 7 
(1950). 
 11. This paper is the second in a series of works that seek to fill this void and shed greater 
light on Kross’s remarkable life and career.  See Quinn, Revisiting, supra note 3; see also Mae C. 
Quinn, Anna Moscowitz Kross and the Original Problem-Solving Court: Lessons to Learn from a 
Lifetime of Judicial Innovation (in progress; on file with author);  Mae C. Quinn, Lady Vols Call the 
Shots in Full-Court Press: Judge Anna Moscowitz Kross and Her All-Woman Auxiliary of Criminal 
Court Case Workers (in progress; on file with author) [hereinafter Quinn, Lady Vols]; MAE C. 
QUINN, ANNA MOSCOWITZ KROSS: A BIOGRAPHY (in progress; on file with author). 
4
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provide important insights for contemporary court reformers as they 
consider the future of domestic violence prosecutions. 
II.  KROSS’S EARLY WOMEN’S RIGHTS WORK 
Anna Moscowitz Kross, a poor Russian immigrant who grew up in 
tenement apartments in Manhattan’s Lower East Side, was among the 
first women graduates of New York University Law School, receiving 
her first law degree in 1910.12  Even as a youth, Kross was concerned 
with women’s rights issues and the interests of the disempowered.13  
Perhaps her earliest and best known advocacy work involved her 
campaign against the Women’s Court, a specialized part of the 
Magistrates’ Court system14 that handled prostitution cases and had 
become known over the years for ineffectiveness, injustice, and 
corruption.15 
As a law student, Kross and others monitored the court’s practices, 
which included inviting spectators to attend the female-only evening 
sessions to observe defendants as they were paraded before the court.16  
As a young lawyer she encouraged volunteer lawyers to join her in 
providing representation for alleged sex workers, some falsely accused 
by vice officers, who could not otherwise afford counsel.17  She went on 
to become Chair of the Legal Committee of the Forum of the Church of 
the Ascension, an organization that offered free legal counsel to women 
in the Night Court.18  In 1915, Kross, only in her mid-twenties, was 
 12. Quinn, Revisiting, supra note 3, at 669-70; see also Salute to Judge Kross, N.Y. TIMES, 
June 13, 1950, at 26 (describing Kross’s upbringing in the tenements of New York); Embattled City 
Aide: Anna Moscowitz Kross, N.Y. TIMES, May 2, 1958, at 16 (recounting that as a law student 
Kross spent much of her time advocating women’s suffrage and assisting women in the Women’s 
Night Court). 
 13. Quinn, Revisiting, supra note 3, at 670; see also Leah N. Neurer, New York Woman Judge 
Attained High Goal Through Sacrifice, Struggle and Determination, 25 WOMEN LAW. J. 52, 52 
(1938-39) (lauding Kross’s work as a teenager teaching immigrants to read English). 
 14. The Magistrates’ Court system was a police court in New York City that handled a variety 
of matters, including adjudication of low-level criminal charges.  See Anna M. Kross & Harold M. 
Grossman, Magistrates’ Courts of the City of New York: History and Organization, 7 BROOK. L. 
REV. 133, 133 (1937-38). 
 15. See generally Quinn, Revisiting, supra note 3. 
 16. Actively involved with various New York City women’s groups, Kross assisted with their 
court monitoring work and also worked with the Prison Committee of the Church of the Ascension 
to provide reentry services for discharged women prisoners.  Quinn, Revisiting, supra note 3, at 
677-81; see also Embattled City Aide: Anna Moscowitz Kross, supra note 12, at 16. 
 17. Quinn, Revisiting, supra note 3 at 678-80. 
 18. Id. at 679-80; see also Martin Panzer, A Real American and A Real Jewess: The Story of 
Magistrate Anna Moscowitz Kross Who Is Being Boomed for the State Supreme Court, THE AM. 
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named as one of only a few “New York City women who . . . made a 
success at their chosen profession” of law.19 
In the years that followed, Kross became increasingly involved in 
public and political life, in part through her participation in Democratic 
Party women’s groups.20  She also became more vocal in her criticism of 
the Women’s Court, which she believed entrapped many innocent 
women, unfairly punished conduct that was really a social problem, and 
failed to meaningfully address the issues that contributed to 
prostitution.21  The criminal court system, she believed, was too 
narrowly focused on the law and not sufficiently interested in social 
science or discovering the causes of problems presented.22 
In 1918, Kross, taken on as a political “protégé” of Democratic 
Governor Alfred E. Smith,23 was appointed as the City’s first woman 
Assistant Corporation Counsel.24  In the Corporation Counsel’s office 
Kross handled family law matters on behalf of the City and conducted a 
study of the courts’ handling of domestic violence matters in New 
York.25 
 Around the same time, Kross’s former law school colleague and 
fellow Women’s Court volunteer lawyer, Jean Norris, was appointed to 
the Magistrates’ Court bench.26  The first woman to hold that post, 
HEBREW, Sept. 30, 1938, at 6; Howard Whitman, Annie, The Poor Man’s Judge, COLLIERS, Mar. 1, 
1947; see also JOHN M. MURTAGH & SARA HARRIS, CAST THE FIRST STONE 224 (1957). 
 19. Quinn, Revisiting, supra note 3, at 679; see also Jean H. Norris, The Women Lawyers’ 
Association, 4 WOMEN’S LAW. J. 28, 28 (1915). 
 20. See New Plea for Steilow: Appelbaum Tells Humanitarian Cult of Commutation Request, 
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 18, 1916, at 22 (indicating that Kross was Chairperson of both the Legal 
Committee of the Church of the Ascension and the New York City Federation of Women’s Clubs); 
School for Women Voters to Open, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 1923, at XX2 (discussing Kross’s 
involvement in the Women’s Democratic Club). 
 21. Quinn, Revisiting, supra note 3, at 679-80; see also, e.g., Anna Moscowitz, The Night 
Court for Women in New York City, 5 WOMEN LAWYERS’ J. 9 (1915); John M. Murtagh, Problems 
and Treatment of Prostitution, 23 CORRECTION 3, 3 (1958) (discussing Kross’s public letter to 
Mayor John Purroy Mitchel criticizing the Women’s Court). 
 22. Quinn, Revisiting, supra note 3, at 679-80; see also Moscowitz, supra note 21, at 9. 
 23. Quinn, Revisiting, supra note 3, at 682, n.88 and accompanying text; see also Panzer, 
supra note 18, at 10; Democratic Women Win Two Places on the Party “Big Four,” N.Y. TIMES, 
Feb. 26, 1920, at 1 (discussing Kross’s involvement in the Democratic Party and ties to Governor 
Smith).  Smith was first elected governor in 1918 and reelected to three additional terms.  See 
generally CHRISTOPHER FINAN, ALFRED E. SMITH: THE HAPPY WARRIOR (2002). 
 24. Quinn, Revisiting, supra note 3, at 682; see also Kross Biography of Dec. 1964, 5-8 (on 
file with New York Corrections History Society). 
 25. Quinn, Revisiting, supra note 3, at 682, n.90; see also Kross Biography, supra note 24. 
 26. Quinn, Revisiting, supra note 3, at 681; Mrs. Jean H. Norris Appointed to Bench: First 
Woman Magistrate to be Named in This State Nominated by Mayor, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 28, 1919, at 4 
[hereinafter Mrs. Jean H. Norris Appointed to Bench; see also Ida White Parker, Justice is Truth in 
6
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Norris was assigned to the Women’s Court.27  Her tenure was cut short, 
however, by her apparent involvement in the very improprieties and 
corruption she and Kross had fought so hard to prevent years earlier.28  
Following a scandalous, high profile investigation, in 1931 she was 
removed from the bench.29 
After much discussion about who should replace Norris, on his last 
day in office Mayor John P. O’Brien appointed Kross as the second 
woman to serve in New York City’s Magistrates’ Court.30  Sworn in on 
January 1, 1934 along with the City’s new mayor and another of her law 
school classmates, Fiorello LaGuardia,31 Kross thus began the next 
important phase of her career—judicial innovation. 
III.  KROSS’S COURT REFORM AND JUDICIAL INNOVATION EFFORTS 
From the beginning of her tenure Kross sought to revamp the 
Magistrates’ court system, which she continued to believe was ill-
equipped to deal with social problems presented in the form of criminal 
Action, THE BUS. WOMAN 8-9, 76 (1923) (describing Norris as a “woman who has climbed 
successfully to the top in the legal profession”). 
 27. Quinn, Revisiting, supra note 3, at 681; Mrs. Jean H. Norris Appointed to Bench, supra 
note 26, at 4; see also Parker, supra note 26, at 8-9. 
 28.  Quinn, Revisited, supra note 3, at 678-79, n.62, 684, n.103. 
 29. Norris was removed in 1931 because of her alleged misconduct in handling prostitution 
cases in the Women’s Court.  Mrs. Norris Fights to Appeal Removal, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 28, 1931, at 
2 (reporting that Norris was removed from the bench on June 25, 1931).  She, along with other 
judges, lawyers, and bondsmen, was accused of various improprieties including delivering 
unfounded convictions and accepting bribes.  SAMUEL SEABURY, IN THE MATTER OF THE 
INVESTIGATION OF THE MAGISTRATES’ COURT IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT AND THE 
MAGISTRATES THEREOF, AND OF ATTORNEYS-AT-LAW PRACTICING IN SAID COURT (1932) 
(Seabury authored a two hundred and fifty-six page report outlining the various facets of his 
investigation of the Magistrates’ Courts and the evidence uncovered, including improprieties on the 
part of Norris). 
 30. Whitman, supra note 18, at 46, 49; see also O’Brien Gives Jobs to 3 on Last Day, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 31, 1933, at 8 (noting that Kross, who was chair of O’Brien’s women’s campaign 
committee during the last election, was a surprise appointment over a Tammany Hall favorite and 
LaGuardia supporter); New Magistrates Assigned, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 3, 1934, at 2 (noting that  
Mayor O’Brien appointed Kross to the Magistrates’ Court shortly before he left office). 
 31. Moscowitz and LaGuardia received Bachelor of Laws degrees from New York University 
Law School in 1910.  See New York University, Seventy-Eighth Commencement Program, June 8, 
1910, at 11 (on file with N.Y.U. Archives); see also Women’s Bar Backs Mrs. Kross For State 
Supreme Court, TELEGRAM, Sept. 14, 1938 (“Kross recalls that [LaGuardia] was one of the few 
male students sympathetic to the idea of women’s suffrage; that he joined a women’s suffrage 
collegiate chapter which she formed with the late Inez Milholland.”).  Kross received her L.L.M. the 
following year.  See New York University, Seventy-Ninth Commencement Program, June 7, 1911, 
at 10 (on file with N.Y.U. Archives). 
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allegations.32  One of her first actions was to call for closure of the 
Women’s Court, the very Part to which she had been assigned.33 
Following her many public statements against the Women’s Court, 
Mayor LaGuardia finally called upon Kross to formally propose an 
alternative for handling prostitution matters.34  In 1935, she responded 
with a substantial report outlining her recommendations, including 
abolition of the Women’s Court.35  She argued that the problems of sex 
workers needed to be handled using the wisdom of the new “scientific 
age” and that a “medical-social” approach to prostitution was superior to 
a criminal approach.36  Thus she urged creation of a more informal 
“sociological court” tribunal outside of the criminal court system staffed 
by a physician, psychiatrist, and lawyer where “[e]ach individual will be 
considered as a whole person” so that a meaningful plan of rehabilitation 
could be developed and effectuated.37 
Although Mayor LaGuardia did not adopt Kross’s call to dismantle 
the Women’s Court, he did heed some of her concerns.38  Thus, Kross 
was permitted to undertake various projects within the Magistrates’ 
Court system that focused on social science-based interventions over 
strict adherence to criminal law and procedures.39  The first such 
experiment was Kross’s Magistrates’ Court Social Services Bureau.40 
 32. Anna M. Kross & Harold M. Grossman, Magistrates’ Courts of the City of New York: 
Suggested Improvements, 7 BROOK. L. REV. 411, 432 (1938) (“The only way to improve the courts 
is to adapt their organization and procedure to the social needs of the times.”). 
 33. Mrs. Kross Scores Vice Case Methods, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14, 1934, at 24; Whitman, supra 
note 18, at 49. 
 34. Quinn, Revisiting, supra note 3, at 686-87; see also Denis Tilden Lynch, Woman in State 
Supreme Court: Advocates Point to Mrs. Kross, N.Y. HERALD TRIB., Aug. 28, 1938. 
 35. Anna Moscowitz Kross, Report on Prostitution and the Women’s Court (1935) 
(unpublished report) (on file with author); see also Quinn, Revisiting, supra note 3, at 686-87; Mrs. 
Kross Favors Social War on Vice, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9, 1935, at 2. 
 36. Quinn, Revisiting, supra note 3, at 687-88; see also Lynch, supra note 34. 
 37. Quinn, Revisiting, supra note 3, at 687-88; Kross, supra note 35; Mrs. Kross Favors 
Social War on Vice, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9, 1935, at 2; Zelda Popkin, Sociological Court Urged for 
Women, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 25, 1934, at SS2. 
 38. Thus began a rocky working relationship between LaGuardia and Kross, which 
deteriorated over time.  Quinn, Revisiting, supra note 3, at 688-91; see also CHARLES GARRETT, 
THE LAGUARDIA YEARS, MACHINE AND REFORM POLITICS IN NEW YORK CITY 161 (1961) 
(recounting Kross’s criticism of LaGuardia’s crack down on alleged gamblers and sometimes 
“lawless law enforcement” used in gambling raids); Anna Moscowitz Kross, Paper by Magistrate 
Kross Presented to the Regional Conference on Social Hygiene 6 (Feb. 5, 1941) (on file with 
author). 
 39. Quinn, Revisiting, supra note 3, at 690; 
 40. Quinn, Revisiting, supra note 3, at 690; A.Y. Yeghenian, Synopsis of History and 
Progress, Magistrates’ Court Social Service Bureau, 1935 to date, (Oct. 1. 1940) (describing the 
group’s work from its creation in 1935). 
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The Bureau was largely a volunteer group developed in 1935 as an 
adjunct to the formal Probation Department to provide social services 
and other assistance to Magistrates’ Court defendants even before they 
were found guilty or sentenced by the court.41 
In 1936 Kross went on to create the Wayward Minors’ Part for 
girls, which dealt with the cases of young women who ordinarily would 
have been processed in the adult Women’s Court Part.42  A sort of 
alternative to the alternative court, the Wayward Minors’ Part relaxed 
legal standards to use a carrot and stick approach towards rehabilitation 
in an attempt to reform young women seen as “sex delinquents.”43 
In the Wayward Minor’s Part, young women were warned they 
would be formally prosecuted and face the possibility of a criminal 
record and jail time if they did not agree to participate in a rehabilitative 
program developed with the assistance of the Social Services Bureau and 
Probation Department.44  The plans of rehabilitation sometimes included 
placement outside of the home in hospitals or reformatories; defendants 
were required to return to court for status hearings so the judge could 
personally monitor progress.45 
Prior to the status hearings, Kross conferred with the court’s 
probation officers and social workers to determine how the young 
women were doing with treatment.46  Defendants who were viewed as 
successful in their rehabilitative efforts were rewarded with no formal 
finding of guilt and often dismissal of the charges.47  Those who did not 
comply or appeared to have “no prospect of an adjustment pursuant to 
the plans suggested” could be brought to trial, adjudicated a wayward 
minor, and immediately sentenced to an institution.48  Kross 
 41. Quinn, Revisiting, supra note 3, at 690, n.145; Kross & Grossman, supra note 32, at 450-
54 (“Its purpose is to do something about the tens of thousands of cases which present, not criminal, 
but social problems.  In appropriate cases it supplements, in a scientific manner, the kindly advice of 
well-meaning judges who must form their conclusions as to underlying social difficulties from the 
hurried presentation of strictly legal evidence in the courtroom.”); Anna M. Kross, Hypocrisy 
Scored in Penal Methods, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 1937, at 5 (describing the actions taken by the 
Social Services Bureau for defendants before any formal adjudication is entered); see also Quinn, 
Lady Vols, supra note 11. 
 42. Quinn, Revisiting, supra note 3, at 690; see also ANNA M. KROSS, U.S. WORKS PROGRESS 
ADMIN., PROCEDURES FOR DEALING WITH WAYWARD MINORS IN NEW YORK CITY 23-26 (1936). 
 43. Kross & Grossman, supra note 32, at 441. 
 44. Id. 
 45. KROSS, supra note 42, at 14-15, 30-31. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Kross & Grossman, supra note 32, at 439-41. 
 48. KROSS, supra note 42, at 18.  Kross conceded that “[t]he[se] expedients are legal, perhaps, 
but only because the defendant, the district attorney and the complaining witnesses consent to 
them.” Kross & Grossman, supra note 32, at 439; Salute to Judge Kross, supra note 12, at 26. 
9
Quinn: A Second Look at the Nation's First Domestic Violence Court
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2008
QUINN_FINAL 3/23/2009  3:03 PM 
742 AKRON LAW REVIEW [41:733 
 
passionately believed that the innovations of the Wayward Minors’ Part 
were a preferred alternative to standard case processing and worthy of 
replication.49 
IV.  KROSS’S HOME TERM PART: THE NATION’S FIRST CRIMINAL 
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE COURT 
After a decade of working the Wayward Minors’ Court, Kross 
expanded her experimentation efforts.50  In 1946, with the support of 
Chief Magistrate Judge Edgar Bromberger, she developed another 
specialty venue within the Magistrates’ Court system—the Home Term 
Court Part – to handle non-felony domestic violence prosecutions.51 
Rather than simply focus on the conviction and sentence of alleged 
abusers, Kross sought to use the social-scientific, interventionist 
approach in misdemeanor and other non-felony family violence matters 
before the Home Term to determine the root cause of the family discord 
and help resolve it.52 In announcing the opening of Kross’s new 
experimental court to the press, Chief Magistrate Bromberger explained: 
The aim of the new court[] . . . is to attempt to settle without legal 
“formalism,” which . . . aggravates such matters, fundamental family 
difficulties that comprise more than 10,000 of the cases now handled 
annually by the Magistrates’ Courts. 
‘It has long been apparent to the magistrates . . . that a mere narrow, 
 49. Kross, supra note 41, at 5 (describing the success of the Wayward Minors’ Court in 
recognizing that the defendants before it were “girls with problems and not problem girls”); Kross 
& Grossman, supra note 32, at 430 (portraying Kross’s establishment of the specialized Wayward 
Minors’ Part as a positive development because the court “seek[s] scientific differentiation of 
treatment for the persons who appear therein, on a sound crime prevention theory”); John M. 
Murtaugh, Functions of the Magistrates’ Courts, BAR BULL., March 1953, at 176 (on file with N.Y 
City Hall Library) (“The Girls’ Term . . . [b]y an individualized approach to their problems, it seeks 
to keep these young women away from the prostitutes with whom they formerly had contact in 
Women’s Court.  The basic philosophy of the court is that it is more important to adjust than to 
adjudicate . . . Its progressive objectives and accomplishments are measured in terms of adjustment 
and self-esteem for many girls and their families.”). 
 50. Kross, supra note 41, at 5; Kross & Grossman, supra note 32, at 430. 
 51. New Courts to Sit in Home Disputes, N.Y. TIMES, March 18, 1946, at 23 (announcing that 
Chief Magistrate Bromberger and Kross worked together on developing the Home Term Court); 
New Marital Court Has Home Setting, N.Y. TIMES, April 30, 1946, at 23 (Kross’s appointment to 
the Home Term by Bromberger). 
 52. New Marital Court, supra note 51, at 23 (“The court will seek to discover fundamental 
causes for the difference between the couple and attempt to apply a solution that will preserve the 
home and assure a proper atmosphere for the children.”); Salute to Judge Kross, supra note 12, at 
26 (describing Kross’s innovation in using social work and psychiatric services in conjunction with 
her court parts, including the Home Term). 
10
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legal adjudication of the immediate marital episode causing an arrest 
or the issuance of a summons in the Magistrates Courts actually settles 
nothing of the fundamental family difficulty.  On the contrary, a 
hearing or trial in open court, with the couple testifying against each 
other – many times in the presence of neighbors – actually provides 
additional hazard to future family tranquility and adds a further 
disturbing factor to the already muddled family condition.’53 
Thus, the goal of Kross’s Home Term Part was to try to help 
domestic partners address problems with practical, workable solutions, 
with the understanding that most couples wanted to try to stay 
together.54  When children were in the home, the goal of intervention 
and reconciliation became even more central to the court’s work 55
Kross and Bromberger had concluded that the prior practice of 
merely “[p]unishing the offenders was no solution; the same ones 
popped up on the calendar again and again.”56  For them it appeared 
there was often “more than met the eye and mind in the constant 
repetition of tales of drunkenness, mistreatment and violence” that made 
their way to the Magistrates’ Court.57  Indeed, with the volume of such 
cases rising as World War II drew to an end,58 Kross and others believed 
that otherwise loving partners might be faltering under the strain of 
returning home to face economic hardship, housing problems, or other 
difficulties.59  In addition, many couples who had wed in haste before 
the war had not spent much time talking about the logistics and 
 53. New Courts to Sit in Home Disputes, supra note 51, at 23. 
 54. RICHARD MAISEL & JUNE CHRIST, FAMILIES IN CONFLICT 17-18 (New York University 
Research Center for Human Relations 1954) (published as “an exploratory study of the progress and 
the needs of the Home Term Court and the Home Advisory Council”). 
 55. New Marital Court, supra note 51, at 23; see also MAISEL & CHRIST, supra note 54, at 8 
(“When children are not involved the judge will not press too hard for social services and the case 
may well end in an agreement to separate.  If there are children, the pressure is strong to keep the 
marriage together.”). 
 56. Willella De Campi & May Okon, Home Term Court Makes a Home, DAILY NEWS, July 9, 
1950, at 5. 
 57. Id. 
 58. See New Marital Court, supra note 51, at 23 (describing “post-war tension difficulties” 
that seemed to affect some couples who would be seen by the Home Term Court); De Campi & 
Okon, supra note 56, at 5 (“The idea for this experimental domestic relations court grew out of the 
appalling upsurge of disrupted-family cases that began overcrowding the regular court calendars 
during the war.”); see also Flaws in System of Home Life Seen, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 1944, at 10 
(reporting on a forum held to consider “[w]artime strains on American family life”). 
 59. Editorial, Topics of the Times, N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 1946, at 24 (“[O]ne current reason for 
the dissolution of families is the inability to find housing . . . it is easy to understand how the strain 
of living in inadequate quarters, or in the makeshift home with relatives of the wife or husband 
would generate unhappiness.”). 
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practicalities of cohabitating.60  To Kross, the philosophy of attempting 
to offer help to relationships and families that might otherwise be 
salvageable was developed in light of the concerns of the day and as a 
considered approach to a particular problem in certain domestic abuse 
cases.61 
In order to facilitate treatment and conciliation, Home Term 
proceedings were conducted not inside an impersonal courtroom but 
within a comfortable complex at 300 Mulberry Street in Manhattan.62 
Modeled to look like a modest apartment maintained by a family with an 
income of $4,000 a year,63 the complex included a living room, dining 
room, kitchen and children’s nursery decorated with donations from 
various businesses and organizations.64  According to Kross, one of the 
most important furnishings in the complex was a “cheery” red love seat 
positioned in the court’s reception room where couples were often asked 
to sit and talk.65  She explained the couch “is symbolic of our great aim.  
Two people must sit close together on it.  This is exactly what we are 
trying to do – to bring together those broken apart.”66 
Despite the seemingly casual approach to domestic abuse cases, 
Kross took the work of Home Term very seriously and believed the 
 60. Kross, supra note 1 (describing “[a] hasty marriage followed by an almost immediate 
separation” as a contributing factor in many cases where an “ex-GI” is charged with drunkenness, 
disorderly conduct, assault or other misconduct in the home). 
 61. Id.; see also Charles F. Murphy, Letter to the Editor, Saving the Family, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 
20, 1952, at SM6.  Thus, contrary to claims of many modern court reformers and domestic violence 
victims’ advocates, family violence had been prosecuted and handled as a criminal matter at least to 
some degree prior to the 1940’s, and the change to a different model in New York City was not a 
function of indifference.  See, e.g., Mazur & Aldrich, supra note 4, at 5 (“The 1990’s witnessed a 
sea of change in the criminal justice response to domestic violence.  For centuries, domestic 
violence had been perceived as a private affair – a personal matter between disputants.  Courts did 
not handle domestic violence cases in large part because domestic or family violence was not 
illegal.”); Thompson, supra note 2, at 417 (suggesting the private nature of family violence resulted 
in it being ignored by the criminal justice system until the 1970s and 1980s). 
 62. New Courts to Sit in Home Disputes, supra note 51, at 23; DORRIS CLARKE & ALICE W. 
FIELD, HOME TERM: A SOCIALIZED COURT FOR FAMILY PROBLEMS IN THE NEW YORK CITY 
MAGISTRATES’ COURT SYSTEM 26 (1948). 
 63. De Campi & Okon, supra note 56, at 4; CLARKE & FIELD, supra note 62. 
 64. De Campi & Okon, supra note 56, at 4.  Even the Metropolitan Museum of Art placed 
paintings on loan with the Court to add to the comfortable surroundings for litigants.  Id.  So 
impressive was the décor that Better Homes and Gardens apparently ran a story on the Home Term 
Court entitled, “Are Nice Things Necessary,” focusing on Kross’s decision to use “attractive 
surroundings” in the court complex to encourage good feelings and good conduct.  William C. Nau, 
Reviews of Professional Periodicals, 15 FED. PROBATION 49, 52 (1951). 
 65. Kross, supra note 1. 
 66. Id. 
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court – the first in New York and likely the entire country67—could play 
an important role in improving society.68  Not only was it developed as a 
place to resolve disputes, but as a cutting-edge social science 
“laboratory” to study and treat family and individual problems.69  She 
hoped to share results with others70 and replicate the Home Term project 
throughout the city and beyond.71  Indeed, after two years in operation, 
the Home Term produced and disseminated a brochure – HOME TERM: 
A SOCIALIZED COURT FOR FAMILY PROBLEMS IN THE NEW YORK CITY 
MAGISTRATES’ COURT SYSTEM—to describe the court’s day-to-day 
operations, share its developing expertise, and provide a blueprint for 
other jurisdictions considering such a model.72 
As with the Wayward Minors’ Court, Kross developed a private 
organization to assist with the work of the Home Term Court.  This 
group, dubbed the Home Advisory Council, consisted of representatives 
from religious and benevolent organizations like the Jewish Family 
Service, Catholic Charities, and the Lutheran Welfare Council, as well 
as lay volunteers.73  Although an independent non-profit organization, 
 67. CLARKE & FIELD, supra note 62, at  3 (1948) (“At its inception Home Term was an 
experimental project, no similar court being in existence so far as was known.”).  Although 
“specialized” courts had been developed in other parts of the country to deal with criminal cases 
growing out of family matters, they appeared to focus on failure to support and neglect by parents 
rather than domestic violence allegations.  See MICHAEL WILLRICH, CITY OF COURTS 153 (2002). 
 68. Gertrude Samuels, Court of First Resort for the Family, N.Y.TIMES, Jan. 6, 1952, SM20, 
SM41 (“To Judge Kross, the Home Term is but the pre-cursor of a still grander design,” including 
the modernization of courts and their reliance on the science of human relationships rather than law 
alone). 
 69. Memorandum from Anna M. Kross to Foundation, Experiment in the Home Term Court 2 
(1949) (on file with author) [hereinafter Memorandum to Foundation] (seeking financial support for 
Home Term Court from foundations and referring to Home Term as a “laboratory for further study 
in the solution of family problems”). 
 70. CLARKE & FIELD, supra note 62, at 8 (describing Home Term as a “research center” for 
“extensive study of families and their problems” where “socio-legal” testing can take place and 
“new procedures and techniques may be tried and new facilities promoted”); Memorandum to 
Foundation, supra note 69, at 2 (“One of the objectives of the Home Term Court is to serve as a 
model which could be implemented in any part of the United States.”). 
 71. New Courts to Sit in Home Disputes, supra note 51, at 23 (announcing that Home Term 
Courts eventually would be set up in all New York City boroughs but Richmond); see also Quinn, 
Lady Vols, supra note 11. 
 72. CLARKE & FIELD, supra note 62, at 1 (Edgar Bromberger writes in his foreword: “Home 
Term is visited almost daily by professional social workers, sociologists, educators, psychiatrists, 
students, legislators and Judges from all parts of the United States and foreign countries interested 
in the various phases of the Court’s activities.”). 
 73. MAISEL & CHRIST, supra note 54; CLARKE & FIELD, supra note 62, at 23; see also 
Memorandum, An Appeal in Behalf of the Home Term Advisory Council of New York – The 
Voluntary Auxiliary of the Family Offenses Part of the Family Court of New York City (unpublished 
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the Home Advisory Council was considered an “adjunct” of Home 
Term, maintained office space there, and had a dual role – both to 
develop cooperation between the court and private social services and to 
provide direct case work services to those who came to the court.74  In 
its case work function the group advanced the court’s goal of providing 
assistance to families in conflict rather than employing a merely punitive 
approach in domestic abuse cases.75 
A case generally made its way to Home Term when one domestic 
partner alleged assault, harassment, disorderly conduct or other non-
felony wrongdoing on the part of another domestic partner.76  Most 
charges were brought by wives against husbands.77  However, a number 
of complaints involved non-married couples and disputes among other 
family members.78  Although some matters were initiated by a 
defendant’s arrest, the majority began by way of summons following 
complaint.79  The arrest numbers were low, in part, because police 
usually restricted such intervention to instances where “the individual’s 
presence [was] a serious hazard to the family and his immediate removal 
from the home [was] necessary.”80  Instead, upon responding to 
investigate family disputes, officers referred complainants to Home 
Term Court to initiate proceedings there.81 
Once a complaint reached Home Term, the relevant parties were 
summoned to court and the case was assigned to a representative of the 
Court’s probation department for a lengthy intake interview.82  Both 
and undated memo among Kross’s papers at the American Jewish Archives, on file with author) 
[hereinafter Memorandum Appeal]. 
 74. CLARKE & FIELD supra note 62, at 23; see also MAISEL & CHRIST, supra note 54, at 1. 
 75. Memorandum of Anna M. Kross, The Origin and History of the Home Advisory and 
Service Council of New York, Inc. (on file with American Jewish Archives) [hereinafter 
Memorandum on Origin]; see also Home Court Aided By Social Agencies, N.Y. TIMES, May 8, 
1946, at 27 (“advisory council representing all faiths is set up to work out domestic problems”); 
New Court to Run on $50,000 Budget, N.Y. TIMES, May 15, 1946, at 18 (describing the limited 
finances of Home Term and its reliance on volunteers to help in family rehabilitative efforts). 
 76. CLARKE & FIELD, supra note 62, at 11.  Nearly 90% of the cases involved allegations of 
third-degree assault, a misdemeanor, or disorderly conduct, an offense considered less serious than a 
misdemeanor.  MAISEL & CHRIST, supra note 54, at 19. 
 77. CLARKE & FIELD, supra note 62, at 9 (“The majority of families appearing at Home Term 
present problems between husbands and wives but a large number of cases also result from 
difficulties between parents and children over 16 years of age.”). 
 78. Id. at 9 (noting that siblings, divorced couples, and those in “common-law relationship[s]” 
also received assistance from the court). 
 79. Id. at 13. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. 
 82. CLARKE & FIELD, supra note 62, at 16 
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parties were questioned by an intake officer to learn as much as possible 
about the specific allegation as well as the circumstances of the parties.83  
The intake officer’s “function [was] to analyze the problem and offer 
guidance, as well as to interpret the Court’s procedures and services in 
light of the family situation.”84 
In discussing the “problem and possible methods of solution” 
available through Home Term,85 the intake officer seldom recommended 
trial and formal adjudication.  Rather, the parties – both defendant and 
complainant—were usually asked to participate in voluntary pre-trial 
rehabilitative “adjustment” services for an indefinite period of time 
before any formal adjudication would be made.86  Because the court did 
not have the power to issue formal orders of protection,87 it sometimes 
also recommended a voluntary “cooling off” period of separation.88  If 
the parties agreed to these various arrangements, no appearance before 
the judge was necessary.  Rather, Judge Kross merely signed off on the 
necessary referral paperwork after consulting with the intake officer and 
served as an “authoritarian” figure available in the background to ensure 
compliance with the plan.89 
Even in cases where the parties requested an immediate hearing, 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id.  
 85. MAISEL & CHRIST, supra note 54, at 9. 
 86. Id. at 10 (describing the possible case paths and social services available through the 
court). 
 87. CLARKE & FIELD, supra note 62, at 11 (explaining that Family Court and not the 
Magistrates’ Court had the power to issue orders of protection and that Home Term was without 
authority to order defendants out of the family home); see also WALTER GELLHORN, JACOB D. 
HYMAN & SIDNEY H. ASCH, CHILDREN AND FAMILIES IN THE COURTS OF NEW YORK CITY 235 
(Assoc. of the Bar of the City of N.Y. 1954). 
It is an ironical fact that the Home Term Court, which is concerned primarily with cases 
of family violence is unable, after proven violence in a criminal-type action, to grant an 
Order of Protection to an assaulted family, but the Family Court, which is concerned 
primarily with non-support and is non-criminal in nature, can give such paper protection. 
Id. (quoting a legal aid lawyer).  
 88. GELLHORN, HYMAN & ASCH, supra note 87, at 237-38  (explaining that “restor[ing] the 
integrity of the home” was the preferred resolution in family violence cases); CLARKE & FIELD, 
supra note 62, at 6 (“Although the philosophy of Home Term is based on a presumption in favor of 
keeping the family united and intact, when study shows this not to be in the best interest of the 
family group, other steps are taken.”); see also Samuels, supra note 68, at 40 (discussing the 
“cooling off” periods that were sometimes employed by the court). 
 89. MAISEL & CHRIST, supra note 54,  at  9; see also Samuels, supra note 68, at 20 (Home 
Term “aimed to use modern social case-work methods, supported by the authority of the court – but 
preferably without resort to formal court action.”).  Over time other magistrates also were assigned 
to Home Term Court, but Judge Kross continued as the lead judicial officer.  GELLHORN, HYMAN & 
ASCH, supra note 87, at 220. 
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Judge Kross pressed the parties to agree to a period of informal 
supervision first.90  After allowing both sides to address the charges and 
air their concerns, Kross generally convinced them it was in their interest 
to adjourn the case for purposes of an informal period of supervision 
before formal resolution of the charges. 
In this way the court used a “carrot and stick” approach to prevent 
further discord or violence in the home.91 Successful adjustment 
generally resulted in case closure without formal adjudication of guilt.92  
Resistance on the part of the parties or failure to follow through with 
informal case work requirements led to a hearing and the possibility of 
the defendant’s conviction and incarceration.93  However, Kross did not 
give up easily on families and often worked with them over long periods 
of time to effectuate change.94  Imprisonment was used sparingly as an 
intervention of last resort, for instance “when the family require[d] 
immediate protection from continued violent and intolerable 
abuse. . . .”95 
These processes were considered a “marked departure from legal 
formalism” as they offered “a flexible, informal, and socialized 
procedure with emphasis on the family’s general welfare rather than 
 90. MAISEL & CHRIST, supra note 54, at 7-9. 
 91. See Kross & Grossman, supra note 32 and accompanying text. 
 92. CLARKE & FIELD, supra note 62, at 19-20. 
 93. Id. at 25. 
Where the Social Services Unit has been unsuccessful in its efforts at helping the family, 
the case is returned to the Court for other action.  It may, then, be reassigned to the 
Probation Staff or a formal court hearing may be held for the purpose of effecting a final 
disposition. 
Id.  
 94. Id.  (“When a case is referred to the Social Services Unit by Home Term the Court usually 
retains jurisdiction until a satisfactory adjustment of the problem has been made.”); Lawyers Play 
2d Fiddle, NEW YORK POST, May 1, 1946, at 8 (“One of the Court’s functions will be to follow up 
its cases to see that settlements are complied with.  Such a case was that of the drunkard who, after 
his wife brought him to court, was referred to Alcoholics Anonymous, reformed, and returned 
home, but is still required to report regularly.”). 
 95. CLARKE & FIELD, supra note 62, at 6.  In addition, if the Court believed a complainant 
was in danger of future bodily harm, the case was immediately sent to the Court of Special Sessions 
for formal prosecution.  MAISEL & CHRIST, supra note 54, at 7.  In the Court of Special Sessions, a 
superior court to the Magistrates’ Court, a defendant had the right to formal presentment of the 
charges and jury trial.  See Mehl, supra note 10, at 7; see also Kross & Grossman, supra note 32, at 
306 (describing the work and jurisdiction of New York’s Magistrates’ Courts and comparing it to 
the work and jurisdiction of New York’s Court of Special Sessions).  Felony-level abuse matters 
were also handled outside of Home Term and, in Kross’s view, warranted standard criminal court 
treatment.  New Courts to Sit in Home Disputes, supra note 51, at 23 (“The Chief Magistrate 
emphasized that the plan is not operative in felony cases ‘or those of a serious nature indicating a 
criminal tendency on the part of the defendant,’ which will go to Felony Court as before.”). 
16
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rigid interpretation of the law.”96  Kross believed it was important to use 
the moment of criminal court contact as an opportunity to reach and treat 
entire families which might not otherwise seek assistance.97 
Although the kinds of services offered by the court varied 
somewhat over time,98 pre-trial adjustment generally involved some 
form of informal case work and marital counseling.99  Because of the 
limited resources of the Court and its probation department, and the 
failure of many litigants to follow through with referral appointments,100 
lay volunteer counselors working with the Home Advisory Council often 
were the ones to provide direct services to, and supervision of, the 
families.101  While most Home Term litigants were poor,102 its 
volunteers were largely recruited from Kross’s own social circle.103  
Kross sought to tap the resources of “mature women” whose own 
children had already left home and whose “native endowment” for 
family life would allow them to serve as role models in addition to 
counselors.104  The group ultimately included “wives of physicians, 
lawyers, . . . business[men], newspaper and social work execu
105
 96. CLARKE & FIELD, supra note 62, at 6. 
 97. Id. at 6-7; Memorandum on Origin, supra note 75, at 2. 
 98. See Memorandum on Origin, supra note 75, at 2 (noting that a “child-parent relations 
clinic” had been operated by the court for a period of time); CLARKE & FIELD, supra note 62, at 6-7. 
 99. CLARKE & FIELD, supra note 62, at 23. 
 100. Memorandum on Origin, supra note 75, at 4. 
 101. CLARKE & FIELD, supra note 62, at 18; see also Memorandum to Foundation, supra note 
69, at 2 (describing the development of the Social Services Unit of the Home Advisory Council); 
Memorandum Appeal, supra note 73, at 2-5 (explaining that because of the inadequacy of the 
Court’s official probation staff, counseling and supervision needs were augmented by the Home 
Advisory Council and its lay volunteers). 
 102. MAISEL & CHRIST, supra note 54, at 14.  Notably, “non-white groups” and Catholics, 
generally seen as members of “the city’s lower income strata,” were also disproportionately 
represented among the families seen by the court.  Id.  For instance, although only 9.5% of New 
Yorkers in 1954 were African-American, for that same year 50.7% Home Term cases involved 
African-American families.  Id. 
 103. Memorandum on Origin, supra note 75, at 5 (“It was agreed that there should be no 
widespread public appeal for such individuals since there would very likely be a response from the 
most undesirable type – those who delight in the chance of telling others what to do.”). 
 104. Id.  The court in several respects attempted to provide models for families to emulate.  In 
particular, the court was focused on helping women become better wives and mothers and set the 
right tone in the home.  One article explained that the spotless and organized Home Term quarters 
and nursery were intended to inspire the wives to keep their own homes similarly.  Samuels, supra 
note 68, at 40 (“By indirection, the court is inviting them to copy.”). 
 105. Memorandum on Origin, supra note 75, at 7; see also Family: 4 Upstate Counties to Get 
Volunteer Counselors Under Ford Grant, N.Y. LAW JOURNAL, Mar. 13, 1968 (“Since 1946 the 
Home Advisory Council has recruited women with college background and family life experience 
as volunteers to help New York City courts with family counseling and referral services.  The 
17
Quinn: A Second Look at the Nation's First Domestic Violence Court
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2008
QUINN_FINAL 3/23/2009  3:03 PM 
750 AKRON LAW REVIEW [41:733 
it.  
 
The counselors met with their clients for sessions at the court 
complex and sometimes conducted further investigations.106  Visiting 
the parties at their home, interviewing other family members, and even 
gathering information from teachers of the parties’ children were well 
within the scope of the actions taken by the lay counselors and official 
probation officers alike.107  The counselors maintained records of their 
work with the family.  The court was kept abreast of problems that arose 
and remained ready to immediately intervene to address them.108 
Beyond ordinary case work and counseling services, some Court 
clients were referred to Home Term’s in-house Alcoholism Clinic, also 
overseen by the Home Advisory Council, to receive “medical and 
psychological treatment.”109  Yet others might be sent to the Home Term 
Psychiatric Unit after intake for study and a more “satisfactory 
understanding of [their] problems.”110  The Psychiatric Unit was run by 
a psychiatrist “on loan” from Bellevue Hospital.111  In a good many 
cases, involuntary hospital commitment followed such referrals, which 
Kross believed demonstrated the effectiveness of the Un 112
As noted, deferral of prosecution for monitoring and services 
required the agreement of both the defendant and the complainant.  The 
Court’s efforts did not, however, target the accused alone.  Rather, the 
Court was concerned with the totality of the circumstances that preceded 
the conflict and believed that both family partners usually contributed in 
volunteers, most of whose husbands are professional or business executives, are given a year’s 
training by professional social workers before they are assigned actual cases.”). 
 106. CLARKE & FIELD, supra note 62, at 16. 
 107. CLARKE & FIELD, supra note 62, at 7-25.  The HOME TERM pamphlet offered a sample 
letter to other court planners which informed school officials that a child’s parents had sought court 
assistance because of familial difficulties and requested the student’s behavioral, “scholastic, 
attendance, and mental testing records” to help the court better understand the family’s problems.  
Id. at 8.  The letter did ask, however, that the school consider the letter a “confidential inquiry.”  Id. 
 108. MAISEL & CHRIST, supra note 54, at 9 ; see also Samuels, supra note at 68, at 20. 
 109. MAISEL & CHRIST, supra note 54, at 12-13; see also Alcoholics’ Clinic for Court Formed, 
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 1952, at FB64 (announcing the addition of an on-site alcohol abuse clinic to 
the list of services offered by Home Term). 
 110. CLARKE & FIELD, supra note 62, at 19, 22-23. 
 111. Id. at 17, 22. 
 112. Id. at 22. 
The effectiveness of the Court’s medical screening is shown by a study of the cases 
committed to Bellevue following medical examination by the Court Psychiatrist.  This 
reveals a comparatively high rate of placement in state mental hospitals from Bellevue of 
cases which might not have been detected at the Court level without psychiatric 
screening. 
Id. 
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some way to the marital breakdown.113  Thus, in most instances the 
alleged victim also was asked to participate in programming.  In this 
way, from intake onward, the court sought “to show each partner his 
share in the problem” and take steps to resolve it to keep the family 
together.114 
One news story provided an example of a wife who might be seen 
as contributing to discord and violence in the home by the Home Term 
Court: 
Often husbands and wives are totally unaware of the reasons for their 
difficulties.  A man may come home drunk and beat his wife, and to 
the untrained observer he may be completely at fault, the wife 
guiltless.  But the skilled investigator sometimes finds there is a subtle 
antagonism of long standing that leads to violence.115 
A study of the Court described another situation where the wife was 
seen as part of the problem as it related to abuse at the hands of a 
husband who used alcohol to excess: 
The themes of conflict vary. . . . Outstanding among them is the 
husband’s addiction to drink.  The Court, however, has learned to 
regard some forms of drinking as the symptom rather than the cause of 
the family conflict.  Take a typical case: the husband is a steady 
worker and a week-end drinker.  Indeed, he often offers his steady 
work history of proof that he is not an alcoholic.  In explaining his 
weekend bouts he describes his wife as a poor housekeeper and a 
woman from whom he gets little warmth, if any, and much nagging.  
He gives the impression that there is no common interest between them 
and no sexual attraction left.  Often this type of drinking begins just 
after a child is born.  Apparently the wife then withdraws from the 
husband.  Since she does not go out with him, he goes by himself and 
drinks to pass the time.  The assault occurs as a rule when he returns, 
drunk, and she starts nagging.116 
In such cases, Home Term’s intake officer might begin familial 
intervention by instructing the “wife not to berate her husband while he 
 113. Id. at 6 (“Home Term consider[ed] the offense in relation to the total personalities and 
situations of the individuals, as well as the physical, medical and social needs of their family 
groups.”). 
 114. MAISEL & CHRIST, supra note 54, at 10.  Indeed, reviewers of Home Term offered their 
opinion that for its litigants “unconscious motivation must have worked in favor of selecting 
complementary neuroses in partners.”  Id. at 23. 
 115. De Campi & Okon, supra note 56, at 5. 
 116. MAISEL & CHRIST, supra note 54, at 22. 
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is drunk.”117  And while the husband might be referred to the Court’s 
Alcoholism Clinic for substance abuse treatment, the wife would also 
receive some kind of “specialized professional help” to address her 
alleged issues.118 
 This approach both surprised and troubled some complaining 
witnesses who had expected Home Term to automatically align with 
them against their husbands.119  Although most complaining witnesses 
did not want to end their marriages or jail their spouses, some wanted the 
Court to act as a “trump card” to help exert control over a range of 
behaviors on the part of husbands.120  The Court viewed these women as 
unduly concerned with vengeance and retribution, and sought to redirect 
them towards amelioration and a way of thinking that would purportedly 
assist in successful conciliation – the outcome most of the women said 
they wanted.121  On the other hand, defendants were said to be pleased 
with the Court’s approach which gave them a voice, held wives 
accountable for some problems in the home, and allowed long-standing 
conflicts to be aired and addressed behind closed doors with a counselor 
rather than in an open courtroom.122 
 Beyond this, Kross claimed that Home Term often discovered 
that it was “the accuser [who was] the offender, not the accused.”123  To 
demonstrate this phenomenon, she pointed to the case of a mother who 
came to court to file a complaint against her eldest son for assault.124  
The mother went on to claim that the rest of her five children had turned 
against her as well.125  At times during the intake interview, the 
Probation Officer found the woman incoherent and difficult to follow.126  
The Officer also learned from the eldest son that his mother had had a 
nervous breakdown in the past and that after the recent death of his 
 117. Id. at 10. 
 118. De Campi & Okon, supra note 56, at 5. 
 119. MAISEL & CHRIST, supra note 54, at 18 (explaining that many wives were “surprised 
when [their] own conduct [was] questioned”). 
 120. Id. at 17-18. 
 121. Id.; see also Memorandum on Origin, supra note 75, at 1 (“Treating family cases as 
criminal cases had proved to offer no real protection to society and to aggravate the basic family 
conflict.”  Thus, in Home Term such matters were dealt with “on an ameliorative rather than 
punitive basis.”);  Kross, supra note 1, at 3 (“Here we are not entirely interested in guilt or 
punishment.  We want to find out what is causing the break in a family and what will hold the group 
together.”). 
 122. MAISEL & CHRIST, supra note 54, at 17. 
 123. Kross, supra note 1, at 3. 
 124. CLARKE & FIELD, supra note 62, at 17-19; see also Mehl, supra note 10, at 8-9. 
 125. CLARKE & FIELD, supra note 62, at 17-19. 
 126. Id. 
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father the family unit had devolved further.127  Working only part time, 
the mother needed to rely on her adult children to help pay rent and 
support the younger siblings, which often caused friction.128  The intake 
interviewer referred the son and mother to the Court Psychiatrist for 
assessment.129  The Psychiatrist then met with the intake interviewer and 
Judge Kross, who all agreed the mother should be committed to 
Bellevue Hospital for further study.130  Although the siblings initially 
were resistant to the idea, the Court and its staff helped convince them to 
file a complaint against the mother.131  With this, the summons against 
the son was dismissed and the mother was institutionalized.132 
Remarkably, nearly all of Home Term’s work took place without 
the involvement of attorneys.  Most of the individuals before the court 
were unable to afford private counsel.133 As the Court was established 
before Gideon v. Wainwright and Argersinger v. Hamlin, defendants did 
not have a constitutional right to counsel.134  Although free counsel was 
provided for some non-felony prosecutions by the Legal Aid Society and 
other groups in New York City,135 Home Term generally convinced its 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. 
 130. CLARKE & FIELD, supra note 62, at 17-19. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id.  This was not the only case where a mother was institutionalized after seeking 
assistance from the court in dealing with her children.  In at least one other instance a mother asked 
the court for help because her son was not attending school, running away from home, and striking 
her.  Kross, supra note 1, at 3-4.  Kross explained: 
Instead of the son being sent to an institution, we at last persuaded the mother to go to a 
psychiatric hospital for examination and treatment.  This case presents the whole crux of 
our problem.  So often the people who come before us need to be examined for nerves 
and general health.  Many definitely require psychiatric treatment. 
Id. 
 133. MAISEL & CHRIST, supra note 54, at 8 (“[M]ost of the Court’s clientele are financially not 
in a position to avail themselves of personal legal advice.”). 
 134. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972).  
Historically, however, New York provided a greater right to counsel for defendants than required 
under federal law.  See Peter J. Galie, State Constitutional Guarantees and Protection of 
Defendants’ Rights: The Case of New York 1960-1978, 28 BUFF. L. REV. 157, 178 (1978-79).  
Indeed, indigent persons accused of misdemeanors in New York were entitled to free counsel as of 
1965.  See People v. Witenski, 207 N.E.2d 358, 360 (N.Y. 1965); see also N.Y. County Law § 722, 
Article 18-B (McKinney 1965). 
 135. Kross & Grossman, supra note 32, at 429, 433 (describing the lack of adequate 
representation for indigent persons charged with crimes in the Magistrates’ Court); see also LEE 
SILVERSTEIN, DEFENSE OF THE POOR IN CRIMINAL CASES IN AMERICAN STATE COURTS 123-135 
(1965) (noting the problem across the United States of lack of appointed counsel for persons 
charged with misdemeanors and minor offenses); HARRISON TWEED, THE LEGAL AID SOCIETY 
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litigants that traditional legal representation was not necessary.136  When 
lawyers did appear in court, the Judge and Home Term’s staff usually 
persuaded them to waive clients’ rights for purposes of informal 
adjustment, suggesting they play a helpful role in resolving the parties’ 
differences.137  With this non-adversarial, problem-solving orientation, 
Home Term established a “new conception of the lawyer’s function.”138 
 Although Judge Kross’s Home Term had many supporters,139 it 
also drew a great deal of criticism over the years.140  Some disapproval 
came from within the ranks of the judiciary, which found Home Term’s 
courtroom operations—including its informality and rejection of judicial 
robes and benches—to be distasteful and disrespectful of standards 
employed for decades in courts across the country.141 
 Other commentators, like legal scholar and sociologist Paul 
Tappan, found the idea of using the authority of criminal courts to 
attempt to address “social” issues highly problematic.142  For instance, 
although seductive in its alleged novelty and concern for litigant well-
being, the “treatment without trial” approach opened the door to judges 
exercising a great deal of control over litigants’ lives and imposing 
personal morality and conduct standards.143  Without any check on 
NEW YORK CITY: 1876-1951 82-100 (1954) (chronicling the provision of legal representation for 
the indigents in criminal cases in New York City). 
 136. See Lawyers Play 2d Fiddle, supra note 94, at 8; MAISEL & CHRIST, supra note 54, at 8 
(“The judges at Home Term tend to use lawyers mainly for clarifying the goals and hopes of their 
clients; that is, as additional resources for helping to mend family conflict rather than as 
representatives of one side in the conflict.”) 
 137. Lawyers Play 2d Fiddle, supra note 94, at 8 (“In several cases, the lawyers brought along 
by complainants and defendants were asked to step aside to allow the court’s social workers to have 
first try at ironing out the disagreements.”); CLARKE & FIELD, supra note 62, at 20 (explaining that 
consent is obtained from counsel prior to the intake interview and that “except in special instances 
[attorneys] are not present when their clients are interviewed by the Probation Staff”); Samuels, 
supra note 68, at 20 (“The lawyers, who asked to see the judge in advance of their clients, are 
agreed that both need psychiatric help.”). 
 138. MAISEL & CHRIST, supra note 54, at 8. 
 139. See, e.g., Salute to Judge Kross, supra note 12, at 12 (recounting that the Home Term Part 
was “recently lauded by the State Probation Commission as a model which should be applied 
throughout the state”).  Murtaugh, supra note 49, at 175 (a variety of complementary statements 
about Home Term by John Murtaugh, the Chief Magistrate Judge who replaced Judge Bromberger). 
 140. Samuels, supra note 68, at 41 (“Not all who have watched Home Term grow approve the 
idea.”). 
 141. Id. at 41 (“Some judges object to the ‘untidy’ appearance of the court.”). 
 142. See Paul W. Tappan, Treatment Without Trial, 24 SOC. FORCES 306 (1945-1946) 
[hereinafter Tappan, Treatment]; PAUL W. TAPPAN, DELINQUENT GIRLS IN COURT 175-209 (1947); 
CONTEMPORARY CORRECTION 10-13 (Paul Tappan, ed. 1951); see also COMMUNITY SERVICE 
SOCIETY OF NEW YORK, A NEW PATTERN FOR FAMILY JUSTICE (1954); GELLHORN, HYMAN & 
ASCH, supra note 87. 
 143. Tappan, Treatment, supra note 142, at 309. 
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Home Term’s discretion or its informal procedures, “individuals 
innocent of any serious wrongdoing or real law violation” could be 
“subject to the rather crude tools of correctional treatment” used by the 
court.144  Tappan worried about the increased focus on “mental 
pathology” and labeling of so many alleged offenders as sick and in need 
of treatment and cure.145 
 Other social service agencies and experts warned there was 
“[s]trong doubt . . . that the Magistrates’ Courts constitute[d] the 
appropriate judicial setting for expansion into what is essentially a non-
criminal field of dealing with the maladjustments of youths and 
families.”146  For them, Home Term appeared to suffer from a 
“confusion of purpose, jurisdiction and procedure” that often 
confounded litigants, duplicated civil court efforts, and used scarce 
resources inefficiently.147 
 Because of concerns about waste and disorganization in New 
York courts, attorney Harrison Tweed was appointed by Governor 
Dewey to head up a commission to review court operations and make 
suggestions for improvement.148 Looking at issues of cost, delay, 
duplication of services, and problems of procedure and practice, Tweed 
initially called for sweeping change within the courts.149  Although there 
was resistance to some of Tweed’s initial proposals resulting in final 
recommendations that were less comprehensive,150 others continued to 
press for significant changes to New York’s family court system.151 
 Professor Walter Gellhorn of Columbia Law School became one 
of the champions of this cause.  In 1954 he published a book-length 
study of the various courts in New York City, in which he lauded 
 144. Id.; COMMUNITY SERVICE SOCIETY OF NEW YORK, supra note 142, at 16-17. 
 145. CONTEMPORARY CORRECTION, supra note 142, at 10-13. 
 146. COMMUNITY SERVICE SOCIETY OF NEW YORK, supra note 142. 
 147. Id. at 18, 40. 
 148. See Barry Mahoney, The Administration of Justice and Court Reform, 31 PROC. OF THE 
ACAD. OF POL. SCI. 58, 59 (1974); see also Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Book Review of New York Civil 
Practice by Jack B. Weinstein, Harold L. Korn and Arthur R. Miller, 78 HARV. L. REV. 1305, 1306 
(1965). 
[T]he Temporary Commission on the Courts under the chairmanship of Harrison Tweed 
. . . , the product of the then generally rising anxiety over the efficacy of the judicial 
establishment, was supposed to look at the administration of justice in New York and to 
make recommendations for its improvement. 
Id. 
 149. Mahoney, supra note 148, at 59-60; Hazard, supra note 148, at 1306-07. 
 150. Mahoney, supra note 148, at 59-60; Hazard, supra note 148, at 1306-07. 
 151. COMMUNITY SERVICE SOCIETY OF NEW YORK, supra note 142, at 38-39; see also 
GELLHORN, HYMAN & ASCH, supra note 87, at 217-38. 
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Kross’s “indefatigable zeal” and “skill at improvisation,” which had 
resulted in the establishment and continuation of Home Term within the 
criminal court system for nearly a decade.152  Despite his admiration for 
her work, however, on behalf of the Bar of the City of New York he 
called for amendment to New York’s constitution to permit state court 
reorganization generally and unification of all domestic relations related 
courts more specifically – including Home Term.153 
 Interestingly, as Gellhorn was about to complete his study, Kross 
was appointed to serve as Commissioner of the New York City 
Department of Corrections.154  Thus she left her post as Magistrates’ 
Court judge.  Nevertheless, having always believed that the family 
conflicts addressed by Home Term should have been handled outside of 
standard criminal prosecution processes,155 Kross was generally 
supportive of Gellhorn’s proposals.156  In 1961, constitutional and 
statutory amendments resulted in restructuring of New York state’s court 
system.157 This included merger of the City’s Magistrate Court system 
with the Court of Special Sessions to form a new city-wide court with 
 152. GELLHORN, HYMAN & ASCH, supra note 87, at 234. 
 153. Id. at 238. 
 154. See Quinn, Revisiting, supra note 3, at n.161 and accompanying text.  Indeed, in his study 
Gellhorn noted Kross’s departure from the bench during this period.  GELLHORN, HYMAN & ASCH, 
supra note 87, at 220 n.*. 
 155. Memorandum on Origin, supra note 75, at 1 (“Treating family cases as criminal cases had 
proved to offer no real protection to society and to aggravate the basic family conflict.”); Topics of 
the Times, supra note 59, at 24 (describing Home Term as a pre-divorce court); De Campi & Okon, 
supra note 56, at 5 (noting that Judge Kross brought to Home Term “a strong humanitarian sense 
and a conviction that family difficulties should be dealt with from a social instead of a criminal 
viewpoint”). 
 156. Kross & Grossman, supra note 32, at 421-422 (1938);  see also Magistrate Urges Family 
Law Study: Mrs. Kross Calls on Women’s Bar Groups to Seek New Procedures for Courts, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 18, 1952, at 45 (Kross recommended “formation of a joint committee of the women’s 
bar associations of the city to make a more intensive study of family problems in the courts of 
different jurisdictions, to develop new procedures aimed at solution of the problems.”).  In a letter to 
Rev. Robert W. Searle, Kross’s confidante and Executive Director of the Home Advisory Council, 
she expressed her approval of Gellhorn’s study and proposals for court reform.  See Letter from Dr. 
Robert Searle to Anna M. Kross (Aug. 8, 1953) (on file with author); see Letter from Anna M. 
Kross to Dr. Robert Searle (Aug. 12, 1953) (on file with author). 
 157. AARON D. SAMUELS, NEW YORK FAMILY COURT LAW AND PRACTICE 6-11 (1964). 
In 1962, as one of the measures submitted under the substantially amended and revised 
judiciary article of the State Constitution, the new Family Court Act was proposed by the 
Joint Legislative Committee on Court Reorganization, . . . The new statewide Family 
Court was based on the judicial article of the State Constitution (Article VI), as that 
article had been extensively revised and amended in adoption by the People in 1961. 
Id. 
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jurisdiction over non-felony criminal offenses.158  An expanded state-
wide family court system also was established.159  Thus, in 1962 Kross’s 
Home Term Part was abolished and non-felony domestic violence 
matters were reassigned to the reformulated family court system and its 
new Civil Family Offenses Part.160 
V.  LOOKING BACK AT HOME TERM AS WE LOOK AHEAD: THE FUTURE 
OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE PROSECUTIONS 
In many significant ways, Kross’s Home Term—a specialized 
criminal court part that handled domestic violence prosecutions in a 
differentiated and particularized manner with a view towards preventing 
further violence—presents remarkable similarities to today’s criminal 
domestic violence courts.  Its establishment of a “dedicated court team” 
including judges, specially trained social services staff, and lawyers 
presents striking parallels to modern specialized domestic violence court 
practices.161 
 158. See Quinn, Revisiting, supra note 3, at n.166 and accompanying text; see generally Robert 
E. Allard & Fred Breen, Court Reorganization Reform – 1962, 46 JUDICATURE 110, 113 (1962). 
 159. SAMUELS, supra note 157, at 7-10 (“[T]he courts which [the Family Court] immediately 
succeeded, the powers, case load and, for the most part, the personnel of which were transferred to it 
to establish the new court on September 1, 1962, . . . These include the Children’s Courts, Domestic 
Relations Court of the City of New York, Girls’ Term Court of the City of New York, Home Term 
Court of the Magistrates’ Courts of the City of New York, Court of Special Sessions of the City of 
New York (paternity cases), Surrogates and County Courts (adoptions).”). 
 159. Id. at 7-10. 
 160. Id. at 41-42.  Under the new Family Court Act: 
A new concept of ‘family offenses,’ including assaults and disorderly conduct suffered 
by wives and others at the hands of members of their own families (Family Court Act, 
sec. 811), which will hereafter treat in civil proceeding such offenses formerly requiring 
criminal complaint (id.), underlies the vesting in the Family Court of exclusive original 
jurisdiction “over any proceedings concerning acts which would constitute disorderly 
conduct or an assault between spouses or between parent and child or between members 
of the same family or household.” (Id., sec. 812). . . . It is found that most of these 
situations require help rather than punishment, and even where they were formerly 
cognizable in criminal courts, as in the Home Term of the former New York City 
Magistrates’ Courts, psychiatric and alcoholism clinics were the principle resort rather 
than criminal punishment.  So, it has been determined, civil rather than criminal 
procedure is required. . . . Allowance is made for those cases in which what may be 
deemed a really criminal situation may appear [and the] court in its discretion, may 
transfer any of its proceedings to the appropriate criminal court. 
Id.  Interestingly, Kross’s Home Advisory Council was kept in place and adopted as an official 
feature of the new Family Offenses Part.  See An Appeal in Behalf of The Home Advisory Council of 
New York – The Volunteer Auxiliary of the Family Offenses Part of the Family Court of New York 
City 1 (1963); 4 Upstate Counties Get Volunteer Counselors Under Ford Grant, supra note 105. 
 161. Mazur & Aldrich, supra note 4, at 6 (“The first domestic violence court in the state 
opened in Brooklyn in 1996, handling felony-level domestic violence cases.  The model was 
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On the other hand, Home Term’s stated goals of attempting to solve 
underlying problems and issues that contributed to discord in 
relationships reflects a fundamentally different orientation than the one 
seen in contemporary domestic violence courts.  As noted, today’s 
domestic violence courts focus almost exclusively on victim safety and 
defendant accountability.162  For instance, modern courts may order 
defendants to participate in lengthy batterer intervention counseling 
programs as part of their standardized approach to intimate violence 
prosecutions.163  However, they are not particularly interested in offering 
help to alleged offenders.164  Indeed, batterer intervention programs are 
known to be largely ineffectual as a method of treatment.165  Attendance 
designed to overturn the ‘business as usual’ approach to domestic violence.  The court featured a 
single presiding judge, a fixed prosecutorial team, and enhanced staffing to monitor defendant 
compliance and provide assistance to victims.”). 
 162. See GREG BERMAN & JOHN FEINBLATT, GOOD COURTS: THE CASE FOR PROBLEM-
SOLVING JUSTICE 158-59 (“The primary objective of most domestic violence courts is enhancement 
of victim safety.  Other outcome measures include reducing recidivism, improved monitoring and 
accountability for defendants, improved case processing efficiency, and better coordination among 
all of the players involved in domestic-violence cases.”); see also id. at 160, n.22 (batterers 
programs seen as a “sanction” for alleged offenders); Mazur & Aldrich, supra note 4, at 7-9 
(defining the core principles underlying domestic violence courts as victim services, judicial 
monitoring, accountability, and coordinated community response). 
 163. NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, supra note 5 (describing the 26-week counseling 
program required of many defendants in New York); see also BERMAN & FEINBLATT, supra note 
162, at 160, n.22.  While practicing as a public defender in New York City, this author had many 
clients ordered into such 26-week programs.  In addition to causing many of my clients to miss time 
from work in order to attend the sessions, the court’s orders often required them to pay for such 
services.  It appeared to me that these financial burdens often worked to hurt my clients’ partners 
and their children in the long run by redirecting resources that would have otherwise been available 
to them.  In addition, several batterer programs in New York City were found to be problematic in 
other ways.  Mazur and Aldrich, supra note 4, at 9 (“One batterers intervention program in 
Brooklyn, not accustomed to being accountable to the court, reported as a matter of course that all 
offenders sentenced to the program were in compliance even if they were not.  When the court 
realized this, it stopped referring defendants to this program.”); see also Sarah Goodyear, Rehab 
Madness, THE VILLAGE VOICE, Feb. 13, 2001 (highlighting a case where a counselor for men 
convicted of domestic violence shot  his domestic partner). 
 164. NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, supra note 5.  Akin to Kross’s approach to such 
matters, a more “controversial intervention is couples therapy, which views men and women as 
equally responsible for creating disturbances in the relationship.”  Id.  Currently, however, this 
approach “is widely criticized for assigning the victim a share of the blame for the continuation of 
violence.”  Id. 
 165. Id.  (A New York Study showed that “Batterer intervention programs do not change 
batterers’ attitudes and may have only minor effects on behavior; a “Florida study found no 
significant differences between those who had treatment and those who did not as to whether they 
battered again or their attitudes towards domestic violence.”); see also Berman & Feinblatt, supra 
note 162, at 160-161 (acknowledging that there is very little research to suggest that batterer 
programs actually change defendant behaviors; court monitoring is likely to have more of an impact 
on recidivism). 
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at batterers’ programs is simply a means of keeping tabs on defendants 
and sanctioning them.166  This arrangement renders today’s domestic 
violence parts outliers in the modern criminal specialty court movement, 
which generally encourages rehabilitation and therapeutic outcomes for 
defendants.167  Interestingly then, contemporary domestic violence 
venues – purportedly “problem solving courts”—seem less concerned 
with trying to solve the problems of their litigants than Kross’s Home 
Term Part of six decades ago. 
This is not to say that all of Home Term’s methods should be 
celebrated or replicated.  In aggressively promoting heteronormative, 
white, upper-and middle-class family values, as well as traditional 
conceptions of women as wives, mothers, and homemakers through 
criminal court processes, many of the features of Home Term likely 
would be seen as problematic by modern feminists and others.168  
 166. Mazur & Aldrich, supra note 4, at 41. 
The primary ‘service’ offered to defendants is batterers programs.  But in New York [] 
batterers programs are used by domestic violence courts primarily as a monitoring tool 
rather than a therapeutic device.  This approach is based on the research about batterers 
programs, which is extremely mixed.  It is unclear whether these programs have any 
impact at all in deterring further violence. 
Id. 
 167. Mazur & Aldrich, supra note 4, at 41 (“There are substantial differences between 
domestic violence courts and other problem-solving courts . . . domestic violence courts are not 
targeted at ‘rehabilitating’ defendants.  Indeed, services are offered primarily to help victims 
achieve independence.”). 
 168. See, e.g., Laura Rosenbury, Friends With Benefits, 106 MICH. L. REV. 189, 194 (2007) 
(recounting critiques of traditional, gendered conceptions of husbands and wives that existed in the 
law prior to the 1970’s); Chrys Ingraham, The Heterosexual Imaginary: Feminist Sociology and 
Theories of Gender, in MATERIALIST FEMINISM 275, 283 (Rosemary Hennessy & Chrys Ingraham 
eds., 1997). 
[H]eterosexual imaginary is that way of thinking which conceals the operation of 
heterosexuality in structuring gender and closes off any critical analysis of 
heterosexuality as an organizing institution . . . . [I]t naturalizes the regulation of 
sexuality though the institution of marriage and state domestic-relations laws . . . [and] 
these laws and public policies use marriage as the primary requirement for social and 
economic benefits rather than distributing resources on some other basis. 
Id.; Barbara Omolade, The Unbroken Circle: A Historical Study of Black Single Mothers and Their 
Families, in AT THE BOUNDARIES OF LAW: FEMINISM AND LEGAL THEORY 171 (Martha Albertson 
Fineman & Nancy Sweet Thomadsen, eds., 1991) (“Because racism permeates and transcends all 
social relationships, economic and political arrangements such as slavery, segregation, and 
desegregation have not operated in the public arena alone, but have seeped into the private arenas of 
sexuality, marriage, and family, and the personal lives of Blacks and whites, men and women.”); 
Ann Willard, Cultural Scripts for Mothering, in MAPPING THE MORAL DOMAIN 225 (Carol Gilligan 
et al., eds., 1988) (“Conflicting views of what women ‘ought’ to do permeate the media, the child 
development literature, and the emerging literature on adult development.  These views are 
embodied in ‘cultural scripts’ for motherhood, messages from the culture about the ‘right way’ to be 
a mother.”). 
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Similarly, in many instances Home Term’s inherent and intense focus on 
preserving the family unit resulted in unfortunate and unfounded victim-
blaming and women being encouraged to remain against their wishes in 
difficult, if not dangerous, situations.169  Like many modern problem-
solving courts, such as those focused on drug-treatment and mental-
health issues, Home Term’s relaxed procedural rules, “teamwork” 
approach for lawyers, and non-adversarial processes would also raise 
serious concerns for the defense bar and civil libertarians.170 
Despite these serious shortcomings, largely a function of the norms 
and restrictions of the day, some of Home Term’s practices raise 
interesting questions for today’s legal scholars, practitioners, and court 
planners, and may serve as a useful point of departure for further 
discussion and reflection.  Compared to today’s domestic violence courts 
with their binary approach to family problems and myopic focus on 
intervening to rescue victims and control defendants, Home Term may 
suggest a more nuanced understanding and approach to social, personal, 
relational, and familial dynamics.171  For instance, by respecting the 
desires of women who wished to stay with their partners or withdraw 
criminal charges, it appears Home Term sought to honor and preserve 
their personal autonomy.172  In developing individualized case work 
 169. See Kristen Bumiller, Fallen Angels: The Representation of Violence Against Women in 
Legal Culture, in AT THE BOUNDARIES OF LAW: FEMINISM AND LEGAL THEORY 95, 97 (Martha 
Albertson Fineman & Nancy Sweet Thomadsen, eds., 1991) (“[W]hen the claim that a woman has 
been sexually assaulted is made, it is often based upon her blamelessness in contributing to her own 
harm . . . [this] claim to innocence is not easily made, for the shadow of guilt lingers (as with the 
defendant.”)); Doug A. Timmer & William H. Norman, The Ideology of Victim Precipitation, 9 
CRIM. JUST. REV. 63 (1984) (“[V]ictim precipitation explanation functions as an ideology which 
blames the victim and diverts attention from the structural causes of crime.”). 
 170. See, e.g., Mae C. Quinn, An RSVP to Professor David Wexler’s Warm TJ Invitation: 
Unable to Join You, Already (Somewhat Similarly) Engaged, 48 B.C. L. REV. 539, 552 (2007); 
Quinn, Revisiting, supra note 3; Mae C. Quinn, Whose Team Am I On Anyway? Musings of a Public 
Defender About Drug Treatment Court Practice, 26 N.Y.U. REV. OF L. & SOC. CHANGE 37 (2000-
2001). 
 171. See Aya Gruber, The Feminist War on Crime, 92 IOWA L. REV. 741, 801-820 (2007) 
(“Accepting such binary characterizations of abusers and victims dispels the government and 
society’s responsibility for creating the conditions precedent to domestic abuse.”); Deborah Sontag, 
Fierce Entanglements, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17, 2002, at 11 (“[T]he criminal justice system is a blunt 
club for a problem as psychologically dark, emotionally tangled and intimate as domestic violence” 
and “the reality is that abused women often make calculated decisions to stay with their partners.”); 
see also Mae C. Quinn, Finding Power Fighting Power (or The Perpetual Motion Machine)(work 
in progress; on file with author). 
 172. G. Kristian Miccio, A House Divided: Mandatory Arrest, Domestic Violence, and the  
Conservatization of the Battered Women’s Movement, 42 HOUS. L. REV. 237, 243 (2005) 
(mandatory arrest policies and “the decision to sacrifice autonomy” are “based on flawed 
conceptions of will and resistance, as well as faulty ideas concerning the curative power of state 
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plans rather than standard case resolutions for all matters, the stated 
concerns and wishes of those involved were considered and respected in 
a way that they are not in many modern family violence courts.173  And 
by taking into account various factors that might help explain improper 
conduct on the part of alleged batterers,174 Home Term avoided a “one-
size-fits-all approach” that seems to permeate today’s domestic violence 
courts and contemporary attempts to explain violence between 
intimates.175 
By recognizing the complexity of human relations and life more 
generally, guilt and future dangerousness of all men was not presumed in 
Home Term,176 nor helplessness on the part of women systemically 
intervention”); Donna Coker, Enhancing Autonomy for Battered Women: Lessons From Navajo 
Peacemaking, 47 UCLA L. REV. 1 (1999); Erin Han, Note, Mandatory Arrest and No-Drop 
Policies: Victim Empowerment in Domestic Violence Cases, 23 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 159 (2003) 
(criticizing mandatory arrest and no-drop policies for disrespecting victim choices and autonomy); 
see also Radha Iyengar, Op-Ed., The Protection Battered Spouses Don’t Need, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 7, 
2007, at A19 (Harvard health policy researcher found that in states with mandatory arrest policies, 
homicides are about 50% higher than in states without such policies). 
 173. See BERMAN & FEINBLATT, supra note 162, at 160, n.22 (noting that nearly 80% of 
alleged offenders in domestic violence courts who receive some kind of mandate are required to 
participate in a batterer intervention program and that Florida requires participation in such 
programs as a matter of law for alleged abusers). 
 174. Indeed, as soldiers return from serving in the Middle East and are not provided by the 
military with sufficient mental health and other services, our courts may be confronting some of the 
same difficult issues Kross faced at the end of World War II.  See Deborah Sontag & Lizette 
Alvarez, Across America, Deadly Echoes of Foreign Battles, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13, 2008. 
The New York Times found 121 cases in which veterans of Iraq and Afghanistan 
committed a killing in this country, or were charged with one, after their return from 
war.  In many of those cases, combat trauma and the stress of deployment – along with 
alcohol abuse, family discord and other attendant problems – appear to have set the stage 
for a tragedy that was part destruction, part self-destruction. . . . About a third of the 
victims were spouses, girlfriends or children or other relatives. . . . 
Id.; see also Ogden, supra note 6, at 364 (acknowledging that 85% of those believed to be batterers 
lived in violent homes as children, with many suffering physical or mental abuse themselves); 
JAMES GILLIGAN, REFLECTIONS ON A NATIONAL EPIDEMIC: VIOLENCE 191 (1997). 
You cannot work for one day with the violent people who fill our prisons and mental 
hospitals for the criminally insane without being forcibly and constantly reminded of the 
extreme poverty and discrimination that characterize their lives. . . .Any approach to a 
theory of violence needs to begin with a look at the structural violence in this country. 
Id. 
 175. See NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, supra note 5.  (“The models that underlie batterer 
intervention programs may need improvement.  New approaches based on research into the causes 
of battering and batterer profiles may be more productive than a one-size-fits-all approach.”). 
 176. See BERMAN & FEINBLATT, supra note 162, at 103 (explaining that in the Brooklyn 
Domestic Violence Court “[d]efendants would be required to participate in batterer intervention 
programs as a condition of bail”). 
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assumed.177  By taking a second look at Home Term – what appears to 
be the nation’s first criminal domestic violence court – modern court 
reformers may learn not only that their innovations are not so new, but 
that there are important insights to gain from the past as we attempt to 
address domestic violence in the future. 
 177. See Gruber, supra note 171, at 801-20 (lamenting essentialist assumptions underlying 
many modern domestic violence prevention approaches). 
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